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Abstract 
We examine the effects of banking supervisory architecture on central bank 
preferences, quantified through a recently proposed measure of central bank 
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1.  Motivation and Hypothesis 
The recently expanding mandate of central banks has generated concerns as 
to how financial stability considerations should interact with the price stability 
objective (especially in periods of crises). Such concerns emerge as topical against the 
background of the newly attributed banking supervisory function to the European 
Central Bank, while Blanchard (2015) suggests that the additional responsibilities of 
central banks have much more salient implications in the case of regulation and use 
of macroprudential tools. 
 
A theoretical argument exists for separating monetary policy and banking 
supervision, highlighting the potential conflict of interest that may arise in attaining 
both objectives with one policy instrument (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995). More 
recently, Ueda and Valencia (2014) show how an expanded mandate intensifies time-
inconsistency problems. Another line of reasoning suggests that combining both 
functions allows for a more efficient conduct of monetary policy, especially during 
economic crises, because of central bank's direct access to supervisory information 
(Peek et al. 1999). Suggestions also exist for incorporating more explicitly financial 
stability concerns in monetary frameworks, e.g., by extending monetary policy's 
horizon to accommodate the financial cycle (Borio, 2014).  
 
The empirical evidence on the effects of banking supervision on monetary 
policy effectiveness is scant and focuses on policy outcomes, indicating that inflation 
tends to be higher in countries where both functions are assigned to the central bank 
(Di Giorgio and Di Noia, 1999; Copelovitch and Singer, 2008). Policy outcomes, 
however, reflect both preferences and constraints (e.g., the structure of the 
economy). Thus, evaluating alternative institutional arrangements by focusing on 
policy outcomes (inflation, in our case) can be an imperfect way of assessing how 
institutions shape incentives and preferences, because often policy outcomes are not 
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under the complete control of the policymakers (Krause and Méndez, 2008). In this 
paper we explicitly consider the direct effect of separating the functions of banking 
supervision and monetary policy on central banks' preferences.   
 
 To proxy policy preferences we use a measure of conservatism proposed by 
Levieuge and Lucotte (2014), which relies on the inflation-output gap variability 
trade-off, as captured by a ȁTaylor curveȂ and is illustrated in Figure 1. Each point on 
the curve represents central bank's preferences with respect to the weight they place 
on inflation variability (��ଶ) over output gap variability (��ଶ). Thus, point A on the 
Taylor curve corresponds to a more conservative central bank as compared to point 
B. To obtain an empirical measure of central bank preferences Levieuge and Lucotte 
(2014) compute the conservatism as the angle value of each point of the Taylor curve, 
which is trigonometrically expressed as:  
 
  �݋݊ݏ = ଵଽ଴ [ቀ�ݐ�݊ ��2��2ቁ ቀଵ଼଴�௜ ቁ]                                                  (1) 
where ��ଶ and ��ଶ are the variances of output gap and inflation, respectively. Using 
(1) and calculating inflation and output gap volatilities by estimating a GARCH(1,1) 
model for each country in our dataset we obtain a rescaled measure of conservatism 
on the [0,1] range, with the values close to 1 indicating a more inflation conservative 
central bank.1  
                                                          
1
 Detailed calculations are available upon request. 
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Source: Levieuge and Lucotte (2014, p.413)  
     
2. Model and Estimation Strategy 
We use a typical dynamic panel data model specified as: 
 
  �݋݊ݏ௜,� = � + ߚ�݋݊ݏ௜,�−ଵ + ߛ� + ߜ�௜,௞,� + �௜ + ߝ� + ݑ௜,௝,�     (2) 
 
where cons is our the measure of conservatism, S denotes Separation as defined above, X  is a 
vector of k control variables, ηi are unobserved country-specific effects, εt are time-specific 
effects and ݑ௜௝�  is the error term. Our main explanatory dummy variable, Separation, 
takes the value of 0 if the central bank is in charge or involved in banking 
supervision and 1 when this function is delegated to a separate institution. We 
construct Separation using data from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Surveys 
(2001, 2003, 2007, 2012) carried out by the World Bank and national monetary or 
banking supervisory authorities. To capture the persistence of central banks 
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preferences we use a dynamic specification with one lag. Our dataset, which is 
determined by data availability and consistency for all the series used, covers 35 
economies2 from 1999 to 2010. The vector of control variables captures several 
aspects of the macroeconomic conditions, monetary policy institutional design, as 
well as, external constraints and exogenous factors. Specifically, macroeconomic 
variables include the GDP growth rate and government spending as percentage of 
GDP. The monetary institutional variables include an index of central bank 
independence (CBI) developed by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) and a dummy that 
captures the adoption of inflation targeting (IT). The IT dummy takes the value of 1 
if the country is an inflation targeter and 0 otherwise, based on the classification of 
Roger (2010). External constraints are captured by trade openness as percentage of 
GDP and capital account openness, as measured by the Chinn-Ito (2008) KAOPEN 
index. Also, to address the level of economic development we use a dummy (DEV) 
that takes the value of 1(0) when the economy is developed (developing) based on 
World BankȂs classification. Finally, to further test the robustness of our findings, we 
distinguish between floating and fixed exchange rate regimes based on IMFȂs 
classification. We estimate equation (2) for the whole sample of 35 countries and, 
then, we re-estimate for the subset of countries that have floating exchange rates. 
 
                                                          
2 Albania, Argentina, Australia, Botswana,  Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic,  
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea,  Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, US. 
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The presence of the lagged dependent variable and country specific effects 
renders the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent for Equation (2). To address this, 
we use the two-step System GMM estimator for dynamic panel data (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). For robustness purposes, we also report the fixed-effects estimator.  
3. Results 
Table 1 presents the results from estimating different versions of Equation (2). 
For the majority of estimations, Separation  emerges as positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that central banks with a remit that focuses only on monetary 
policy tend to be more inflation averse than those which are also assigned to banking 
supervision. These results remain quite robust when we consider different 
specifications that focus on different control variables. Additionally, our results 
show that inflation targeters tend to have a stronger preference for inflation stability. 
This suggests that monetary policy frameworks may be endogenous to preferences.  
To further test the robustness of our results we consider a number of 
additional controls. Following Copelovich and Singer (2008) we add the size of the 
banking sector (domestic credit as percentage of GDP), and its interaction with 
Separation. We also consider the interaction of Separation with its interaction with IT. 
Even thought the GMM results should be cautiously read as they do not satisfy all 
the necessary properties, the evidence still shows that separating monetary policy 
and bank supervision is positively associated with central bankȂs conservatism.  
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Finally, we replace conservatism (preferences) variable with simpler measures 
of central bank performance, such as inflation volatility3. If our hypothesis is valid, 
we would expect a negative relationship between separation and inflation volatility; 
a central bank that focuses only on price stability and not on supervision should 
display a better performance in combating inflation. The findings corroborate those 
of the basic model specification since the inflation variability coefficient is always 
negative and statistically significant (columns 8-12). Interestingly, for most of the 
cases, the interaction term of separation and IT is statistically significant. This 
indicates that the effect of separation in shaping more inflation-averse policies tends 
to be smaller within an inflation-targeting regime.   
   
<Table 1 here> 
 
4. Conclusions  
A debate exists on whether financial stability concerns in general and banking 
supervision in particular should be incorporated into monetary policy 
frameworks. In this note we consider how separating monetary policy and 
banking supervisory functions affects central banksȂ preferences. Our evidence 
suggests that separating the supervisory function is an important determinant 
in framing more inflation-averse policies. Additionally, among various features 
of central bank institutional design, IT emerges as the one which is decisively 
associated with strong preference for price stability. Clearly, the nature and 
                                                          
3 We thank an anonymous referee for stressing this point.  
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availability of institutional data to address such issues pose a challenge. A 
future research step is to develop and analyze more detailed indices on the 
areas of central banks' focus, and therefore more variation in the data. 
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Table 1. Bank Supervision function and Central Bank Conservatism 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Alla,1 Alla,2 Floatinga,1 Floatinga,2 Allb,1 Allb,2 Floatingb,1 Floatingb,2 Allb,1 Allb,2 Floatingb,1 Floatingb,2 
             
Lag of Conservatism -0.0711 -0.150 0.0338 -0.205 - - - - - - - - 
 (0.0971) (0.131) (0.111) (0.215) - - - - - - - - 
Separation 0.119** 0.480** 0.0414 0.599* 0.016* -.022 .021** .017 -1.743* -1.212* -1.725** -1.550* 
 (0.0600) (0.238) (0.0866) (0.317) (0.007) (.023) (.008) (.042) (.809) (.662) (.731) (.716) 
CBI -0.193 0.0112 -0.127 -0.525** 0.173 .231 .156*** .230** -7.331** -3.991** .469 -4.816** 
 (0.265) (0.590) (0.271) (0.216) (0.056) (.074) (.044) (.078) (2.760) (1.687) (3.742) (1.844) 
GDP Growth -0.00383 -0.0221 -0.00367 -0.0428 0.005 .003 .009 .007 -.275 -.091 -.439 -.010 
 (0.0256) (0.0298) (0.0161) (0.0507) (0.003) (.002) (.006) (.004) (.212) (.051) (.290) (.038) 
IT 0.174** 0.305* 0.0257 0.410** 0.040** .036** .059*** .058** -5.275*** -.635 -6.704*** -.549 
 (0.0779) (0.156) (0.0766) (0.176) (0.014) (.014) (.017) (.021) (1.515) (.381) (1.875) (.926) 
Trade Openness 0.00119 0.00128 -0.000148 -0.000361 -0.0002 -.0002 .001* .0006* .060*** -.007* .019 -.009*** 
 (0.00208) (0.00208) (0.00194) (0.00164) (0.004) (.0004) (.0003) (.0003) (.014) (.004) (.013) (.002) 
KAOPEN  -0.0711  0.184*  .040*  .040  .005  -.211 
  (0.118)  (0.0998)  (0.020)  (.025)  (.209)  (.247) 
Developed dummy 0.0322 0.222 -0.0304 -0.227 - - - - - - - - 
 (0.135) (0.306) (0.129) (0.154) - - - - - - - - 
Government Spending -0.0164 -0.0161 0.00246 -0.0127 -0.009** -.012* -.014** -.020* -1.064*** .115 -1.422*** .021 
 (0.0115) (0.0118) (0.0108) (0.0159) (.004) (.005) (0.004) (.009) (.156) (.102) (.298) (.087) 
Domestic Credit  0.000563  0.000623  -.001**  -.0005  .0132  .012 
  (0.00139)  (0.000888)  (.0003)  (.001)  (.008)  (.011) 
DomesticCredit*Separation   -0.00132  -0.00151  .001**  .0005  -.014*  -.0102 
  (0.00127)  (0.00103)  (.0004)  (.0009)  (.008)  (-.010) 
IT*Separation  -0.346  -0.438**  -.033  -.039  1.770**  2.268*** 
  (0.234)  (0.212)  (.024)  (.031)  (.751)  (.697) 
Constant 0.738** 0.880* 0.927*** 0.969*** 0.898*** .972*** 0.918*** 1.017*** 19.210*** 4.192* 28.721*** 5.770*** 
 (0.296) (0.499) (0.239) (0.284) (0.040) (.063) (.067) (.046) (2.424) (2.181) (5.133) (1.223) 
             
Observations 385 378 264 257 420 420 281 281 420 420 281 281 
AR(1) 0.072 0.143 0.137 0.135 - - - - - - - - 
AR(2) 0.335 0.539 0.971 0.668 - - - - - - - - 
Hansen Test 0.753 0.339 0.138 0.493 - - - - - - - - 
No of Instruments 22 25 22 25 - - - - - - - - 
No of Countries 35 35 24 24 35 35 24 24 35 35 24 24 
Notes: a refers to GMM estimation, while b refers to fixed-effects. 1 and 2 stands for the parsimonious and the extended version of equation (2), respectively. For GMM, robust 
standard errors with finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix as developed by Windmeijer (2005) are reported in parenthesis. We collapse our instruments 
as suggested by Roodman (2009) to reduce moment conditions. For fixed-effects, Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** , ** , * shows statistical 
significance for 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
